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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss-PuNISHMENT FOR AcTs
DoNE WITHOUT CONSCIOUSNESS OF WRONGDOING - In the recent
case of United States v. Dotterweich 1 the United States Supreme Court
(four justices dissenting) held the president of a drug jobbing company personally liable for violation of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act 2 on informations charging misbranding and adulteration
of products. There was no evidence of any personal guilt on the defendant's part, nor was there any proof or claim that he ever knew of
the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in question. 8
The disagreement among the members of the court was essentially one
320 U.S. 277, 64 S. Ct. 134 (1943).
52 Stat. L. 1040 (1938).
8 See Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 at 285 (1943).
1

2
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of statutory interpretation,4 but in view of the fact that defendant's liability is vicarious in nature and is without knowledge or consciousness
of any wrongdoing, we properly might give some consideration to the
propriety and constitutional justification for the imposition of such liability.
.
In the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution it is provided that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law"; these restrictions are respectively
on the Federal Government and on the state governments. Attempts
to formulate a precise definition of the concept of "due process of law"
have been unsuccessful, but it is generally accepted that the phrase
means a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which :q.ave been established in our systems of jurisprudence for
the protection and enforcement of private rights.5 And yet it must be
understood th~t the clause does not apply only to the enforcement of
laws-it applies equally to th·e making of laws, so that in the creation
of new statutes the legislative body must give consideration to all private and individual rights and property interests to be affected thereby.0
This means that in testing the constitutionality of an act the courts will
examine the legislative competency both as to jurisdiction to act and as
to the reasonableness and propriety of the particular regulation of
human activity then under consideration-all as measured by an application of the "due process of law" concept.
It would be impossible within the short space of a few pages to discuss, even summarily, the manifold applications of the due process
clause to legislative enactments. Therefore, our only consideration here
is the application of t]ie due process clause to the creation of criminal
liability for acts theretofore treated as innocent,7 and the further application thereof to legislative alterations of requisite operative facts of
criminal liability, such as the elimination of the elements of intent,
consciousness of wrongdoing, and wilfulness.
The authority of legislative bodies, either state or federal, to create
new crimes and to alter the essential elements of old crimes is derived
· from police power bestowed by the Federal Constitution. The police
4 The court split upon the proper interpretation of the words "any person" as
used in§ 303(a) of the statute, The majority concluded that Congress did not intend
thereby to impose liability solely upon a corporation [ which is defined as a "person" in
§ 201 ( e)] violating the statute, but intended to extend liability to the officers and
agents of such corporation.
5 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 at 288, 45 S. Ct.
61 (1924); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 at 733 (1877).
6 State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) (1933).
7 People v. West, 106 N.Y. 293 at 296, 12 N.E. 610 (1887). "The power of
the legislature to define and declare public offenses is unlimited except insofar as it is
restraine"d by constitutional limitations."
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power of the states is considered to be a plenary power to legislate for
the general welfare of its citizens,8 whereas the police power exercisable
by the Federal Government, being a government of limited powers, is
confined to those fields which have been specifically delegated to it by
the Federal Constitution. Within the areas specially delegated, h9wever, the Congress- has full power to legislate for the public welfare-but there must be a "peg" on which to hang the exercise of such
power.° Whether or not the particular exercise of the police power in
question is by the state or Federal Government, the due process clauses
of the Constitution stand as limitations thereon, and it must appear to
the satisfaction of the courts that any restriction upon individual liberty,
or any deprivation of property, is justified by public needs, serves the
general public welfare, and is not exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.10 The constitutional provisions of due process. thus establish limitations upon the police power of legislatures in the creation of crimes
and the imposition of punishments.
1
It has been stated that the due process clause was intended to guarantee to the individual those rights which he had at common law at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution,11 but this does not mean that
the due process clause prohibits the <;:ongress or the legislatures from
forbidding a person to do things simply because he might have done
them at common law. Where public interest demands it, the legislature
may impose such prohibitions as it deems necessary to achieve the desired end. 12
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 at I u, 31 S. Ct. 186 (1910).
The "peg" on which the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act hangs is the
power to regulate commerce.
For an excellent discussion of the power of the federal government to legislate
for general welfare see Cushman, "The National Police Power," 3 MrnN. L. REv. 289,
381,452 (1919); 4 id., 247,402 (1920).
10 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934); Nashville, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S. Ct. 486 (1935).
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, in Noble State Bank v. Haskc~Il, 219 U.S. 104 at
IIO, 31 S. Ct. 186 (1910), that a "comparatively insignificant taking" of liberty or
property in aid of what is held by strong and preponderant public opinion to be greatly
and immediately necessary to public welfare would not be denial of due process.
To the effect that a statute enacted in the exercise of police power is uncontrolled by the constitutional requirement of due process, see Durh.am Realty Co. v.
La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429 at 442, 130 N.E. 601 (1921); Rowland v. Morris, 152 Ga.
842 at 845, I I I S.E. 389 (1922).
11 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, IlO P. 1020 (1910) where a statute which
removed the right to defense of insanity was held unconstitutional because the court
found that such element was so inherently related to the guilt or innocence of persons at
common law that it could not be taken away without violating constitutional guarantees.
12 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186 (1910).
The due process clause does not prohibit changes in the general body of law, common and statute. Bai:dwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890).
8
9
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At common law it was an indictable offense to mix or sell adulterated or unwholesome foods for human consumption,13 but, inasmuch as
there are no common-law offenses against the United States, any federal liability in respect thereto must be dependent upon statute-and
such liability is presently imposed by the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938. Likewise liability for this offense has been
enacted into statutory form in the majority of states.
In the absence of express statutory provision to the effect that criminal liability for misbranding or adulteration of products is incurred
only when "knowingly" done, it appears that the weight of authority favors an interpretation, both in the state statutes 14 and in the
federal act,15 imposing liability upon sellers even though the prohibited
sale is made without knowledge of the wrongdoing and without intent
to violate the statute. The sale of_ such products thus becomes an act to
be performed at the peril of the seller, and cannot be made harmless by
his good faith or his want of knowledge or wrongful intent.16 The
reason for the elimination of the operative fact of intent from the
statutes imposing criminal liability for sale of adulterated or misbranded goods is apparent-to permit such a defense would be to allow
every violator to avoid liability merely by pleading lack of knowledge
and thus, practically, nullify the statute and defeat the purpose and
intent of the legislature. The general public interest in obtaining
wholesome foods properly branded is considered a sufficient justification
for imposing such absolute liability upon the seller of adulterated and
misbranded products, and it is therefore a proper exercise of the police
power by state and federal governments within the limitations of the
13 People v. Schwartz, 28 Cal. App. (2d Supp.) 775, 70 P. (2d) 1017 (1937);
State v. Schlenker, IIZ Iowa 642, 84 N.W. 698 (1900); but if defendant did not
know of the unwholesomeness of the food and could not have ascertained by exercise
of reasonable care, there was no criminal liability, Hunter v. States, 38 Tenn. 91
(1858).
14 See annotation on duty of seller to ascertain at his peril that articles of food conform to food regulations in 28 A.L.R. l 3 8 5 ( l 924).
15 United States v. n¼ Dozen Packages, etc (D.C.N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 208;
United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 500, which is
the principal case in the lower court. Likewise in respect to the l 906 act, which the
1938 superseded, Yon Bremen v. United States, (C.C.A., 2d, 1912) 192 F. 904; see
annotation L.R.A. 19 l 6D l 70.
16 The legislature may in the maintenance of a public policy regarding certain acts
·
provide that "he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to
plead in' defense good faith or ignorance." Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minn., 218 U.S.
57 at 70, 30 S. Ct. 663 (1910).
The only defense to a charge of adulteration or misbranding under the 1938 federal act, cited note 2 supra, is found in § 303(c) where immunity may be had by
establishing a guaranty obtained from the vendor as to no adulteration or misbranding.
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due process clauses to eliminate the element of intent.1 7 It is the avowed
purpose of these statutes which make the sale of food an act to be done
only at the seller's peril that a greater degree of diligence should be required in the preparation and distribution of foods for human consumption. The possibility of harm to public health and life is so great in the
distribution of unwholesome food that any person embarking on such
business must. take the risk of liability without any wrongful intent.
The only constitutional limitation which is imposed upon such exercise
of the police power is that the degree of diligence required in order to
meet the standarcm set by the statute shall not be so high as to be beyond
the reasonable possibility of human compliance.18 The imposition of
any higher standard would constitute a violation of the due process
guarantee of the Constitution.19
Consideration should here be given to statutes which impose criminal liability upon employers for the wrongful acts of their employees,
and also to the instances where corporate officers are held liable for the
wrongs of subordinates. There would seem to be no difficulty in the
former case in excusing the employer from liability where the wrongful
act required intent or knowledge of wrongdoing and it did not appear
that the employee's criminal act was done at the direction or with the
express or implied consent of the employer-the requisite element
that the act be knowingly done is not present in respect to the employer.20 Of course if it appears from the facts of the particular case
that the wrongful act was done upon the employer's authority, the imposition of liability would be proper, the employer being directly responsible for such wrongful acts of his employees. In most instances
where the master is held to be responsible criminally for the wrongful
conduct of his servants it is on the theory that the act complained of is
positively forbidden ( e.g., food adulteration statutes) and therefore
knowledge or guilty intention is not essential to a conviction for the
11

Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 at 578, 31 S. Ct. 612

(1911). "The power of the legislature to declare an offense, and to exclude the element of knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to its commission, cannot, we
think, be questioned." See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S. Ct. 301
(1922).
18 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 at 395, 34 S. Ct. 779 (1913). "The 'due
process of law' clause, however, does not impose an unattainable standard of accuracy."
(Referring to misspelling of names in service of summons).
19 Inasmuch as most of the pure food acts presently in force do not relieve from
liability upon a showing of reasonable care in checking of food products, could it be
contended that where it appeared necessary to examine each container to detect any
adulteration that such would be requiring too high a standard of efficiency and would
be violation of due process of law?
20 State v. Muehler, 38 Minn. 497, 38 N.W. 691 (1888); Lathrope v. State, 51
Ind. 192 (1875).
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o:ffense.21 If it is the policy of the law to positively prohibit certain acts
because required by public interest, irrespective of what the motive or
intent of the person violating the statute may be, no principle of justice
or of due process of law is violated by holding the master liable for the
wrongful acts of his servant on the same theory of vicarious liability
by which the employer is held responsible civilly.22 It would be inconceivable that by delegating to his employees the power to make sales of
unwholesome foods or to do other prohibited acts, an employer might
avoid liability in a business which he conducts at his own peril.
In the principal case the relationship is not one of master and servant, but, rather, that of corporate officer (Dotterweich was president
and general manager) and subordinate. Presumably the violation was
by a subordinate inasmuch as it is stated in Justice Murphy's dissenting
opinion, «There is no evidence in this case of any ~ersonal guilt on the
part of the respondent. There is nd proof or claim that he ever knew
of the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in question,
much less that he actively participated in their introduction." 23 But the
imposition of criminal liability upon Dotterweich as president and general manager of the corporation is not without precedent: criminal liability of corporate officers has been based upon nothing more than the
fact of their responsibility for the corporation's management.24 It would
seem that such is not an improper extension of the principle of vicarious
liability, nor would the corporate officer have basis for complaint of
want of due process when it appeared that such extension served the
public welfare by requiring a higher degree of diligence and greater
managerial supervision.
Somewhat analogous to our present problem are the statutes which
make a crime of possession of an automobile from which identifying
marks have been removed. Such statutes are upheld as being constitutional and not a denial of due process even though it would appear that
not only are the elements of intent and knowledge made immaterial in
determining guilt, but, in addition, the accused may be convicted for
mere possession of such a vehicle when, as a matter of fact, there has
been no affirmative act on his part in violation of the statute and the
wrongful act may ·have been that of another for whom he is not re,

People v. Passing, 137 Mich. 303,_ IOO N.W. 396 (1904).
New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 at 494, 29 S. Ct. 304
(1908).
28 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 at 285-286 (1943).
24 State v: Burnham, 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218 (1912) where a manager of a
milk concern was said to be liable under a statute making "every person" who sold milk
below a fixed standard guilty of a misdemeanor.
,
See Le~, "Corporate Criminal Liability," 28 CoL, L. REv. lat 16 et seq. (1928).
21
22
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sponsible.25 The only justification for holding such statutes to be constitutional is that the creation of such a crime is a proper exercise of the
police power and that public necessity requires the imposition of such
strict liability in order to avoid the interposition of the defense of want
of knowledge or that the defacing had been done by a third party unknown to the accused which, in effect, might reduce the enforcement
of the statute to a nullity.
Finally, we should consider briefly those statutes which attempt to
deny to accused persons the right to the defense of insanity. In the only
two cases which consider such statutes the courts have held them to be
unconstitutional as a violation of due process of law. 26 In enacting these
statutes it was undoubtedly the thought of the legislatures that such was
a proper exercise of their police power; but when the Court considered
this problem in the earlier of the two cases it determined that the statute
was not a proper exercise of the police power.
"It will be conceded that the legislature has a broad discretion in defining and prescribing punishment for crime, but broad
and pervading as the police power is, it is not without constitutional limitations and restraints, and we can scarcely conceive of a
valid penal law which would punish a man for the commission of
an act which the utmost care and circumspection on his part would
not enable him to avoid." 21
The Court accepted without dispute the authority of legislatures to
eliminate the element of intent from liability for criminal acts, but
denied that there was any analogy between a man who may have sold
adulterated food without knowledge of his wrongful act and the
insane person who kills another; in the former, although he does not
intend to sell the particular kind of food, he does intend to make a sale,
while the insane person is incapable of intending any wilful act. The
basis .for refusing this analogy seems to be that inasmuch as at common
law an insane person could not be legally punished for a crime committed by him the legislature is without ~uthority to eliminate the ele25 People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 123 N.E. 543 (1919) annotated in 4 A.L.R.
1535 at 1538 (1919). The court there recognized the possibility of some injustice
under the act to the owner or a car the serial numbers of which had been altered by
another, but it disposed thereof by saying at p. 446, "Laws cannot be held invalid
merely because some innocent person may possibly suffer. The principle of police
regulation is 'the greatest good to the greatest number'." See also annotation 42 A.L.R.
1149 (1926).
26 Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931), annotated 74 A.L.R.
241 at 265 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 69 Wash. 106, II0 P. 1020 (1910).
27 Rudkin, C. J., in State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106 at 128-129, 110 P. 1020
(1910).

IIIO

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

ment of wilfulness from the punishable act; but how can this be reconciled with this same Court's acceptance of the legislature's power to
eliminate the element of intent? 28 If it should a_ppear that public necessity and general welfare required the exclusion of the element of wilfulness from crimes, why is it not a proper exercise of the police power to
make that elimination just as in the case of exclusion of knowledge or
int~nt, which is unanimously accepted as constitutionally-proper? If the
purpose and end of punishment and/or confinement for crime is the protection of society from similar occurrences in the future, then it would
seem that there was equal necessity to protect society from danger in
the case of the irresponsible as well as the responsible. "Moreover we
must remember that always first comes the public welfare and public
safety. Second comes the care for the innocent victim of the criminal
act. Lastly should we deal witli the accused party, but his interests
ought not to be considered in preference- to these other paramount securities of freedom." 29
In summarizing the present state of the law as regards due process
and its applicatio~ to criminal statutes punishing acts done without consciousness of wrongdoing, it appears (a) that the operative facts of
knowledge and intent may be eliminated without violation of the guarantee of due process of law, so long as there is a proper showing of public -welfare and _µecessity requiring such elimination; but (b) that the
courts have been unwilling to permit an elimination of the element of
wilfulness from liability under criminal statutes, as demonstrated by
their decisions holding unconstitutional those statutes which have attempted to withdraw the defense of insanity.
Benjamin M. Quigg, Jr._ (S.Ed.)

28 See Laylin and Tuttle, "Due Process and Punishment," 20 MICH. L. REv. 614
(1922); the authors support the position of the court in the Strasburg case.
29 White, "Legal Insanity in Criminal Cases," 18 J. CRIM. L. AND CruM. 174
(1927). See also dissenting opinion of Smith, C. J., in Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142,
132 So. 581 (1931).

